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We  examine  the  geo-political  and  international  spatial  aspects  of  human  rights  (HR),  using  a  purpose-
designed  data-set.  Applying  tools  from  the  spatial  economics  literature,  we  analyse  the  impact  on  a 
country’s  HR  performance  of  geographical  proximity  to  its  neighbours.  Unlike  previous  studies,  our  approach 
treats  this  as  partly  endogenous:  one  country’s  HR  performance  will  affect  its  neighbours  through  a variety 
of  potential  geographical  spillover  mechanisms. We  start  with  simple  descriptive  accounts,  using  scatter  plots, 
of  the  geographic  history  of  HR  performance.  Using  a  relatively  simple  spatial weighting  model  approach  we 
compare  each  country’s  HR  performance  with  what  would  be  predicted by regression on a weighted average of 
its  neighbours’ performance (i.e.  weightings depending positively on  country  population, and  negatively upon 
distance), using a cross sectional and panel dataset of one hundred and sixty countries.  We  regress  measures 
of  population  size,  distance  between  countries,  the  prevalence  of  war  or  ethnic  conflict, as well as per capita 
incomes and distribution, to test the general hypothesis that there may be positive spillovers  between  neighbours’ 
human  rights  performance.  This  is  then  extended  to  derive  measures of  HR  performance  relative  to  both 
economic,  social  and  spatial  factors. 
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1  Introduction 
The observation of high standards of human rights protection has long been recognised as one 
of  the  distinguishing  features  of  advanced  societies.  Even  when  we  differentiate  between 
economic rights and basic rights, such as habeas corpus, the absence of torture, or freedom of 
expression and worship, there is a clear difference between advanced nations and developing 
countries.  
 
This pattern has both economic and geographic aspects.  Comparing trends in human rights 
(HR) across World regions over the past three decades there are two broad ‘clubs’ evident. In 
1980:  the  one  consisted  of  Western  Europe,  North  America  and  Oceania,  and  the  other 
contained the Rest of the World. Between 1980 and 2004 the only major change is in the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), which move from the ‘bad’ convergence 
club to the ‘good’ (note some Latin American countries have also improved significantly). Our paper shows that these trends reflect both income and spatial factors. As regards income, 
using a comprehensive measure of non-economic human rights (Landman and Larizza, 2009) 
a clear relationship can be shown: ranking 149 countries in 2004 according to GDP per capita, 
19 out of the top 20 countries are also in the top 30 in terms of human rights (the exception, 
the USA, being 69th). At the other end of the table, however, while several out of the bottom 
20 countries in terms of per capita GDP also rank badly for human rights (HR) - Congo, 
Burundi, Ethiopia, Chad, Nepal - it is also noticeable that Mali is 34th in terms of HR, while 
Ghana, Burkina Faso and Guinea Bissau are in the top 60.  
 
To date, economists, with a few exceptions (Sykes, 2005), have paid relatively little attention 
to human rights as such. In this, economics lags behind the disciplines of law (Freeman, 2001) 
and political science (Landman, 2005b). However in recent years international economics has 
become  generally  more  concerned  with  socio-economic  phenomena,  such  as  the  relative 
quality  of  national  institutions  (security,  law,  governance)  in  trade  performance  (Nunn, 
2007a) and in particular in the role of social, institutional and political factors in growth (see 
Djankov et al, 2003; Acemoglu et al, 2008; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu,2003; 
Nunn, 2007b, Tabellini, 2008 and 2010).  
 
The role of HR (other than property rights and the rule of law) to these crucial relationships in 
the developmental process is still, however, clouded in obscurity. Admittedly, Sala-i-Martin 
(1997)  does  indicate  a  clear  role  for  HR-type  variables  in  promoting  economic  growth. 
However, despite strong arguments (Acemoglu et al, 2004) that political institutions underlie 
the poverty traps besetting many countries, there has still been relatively little analysis of the 
role of human rights other than property rights in sustaining such traps. To some extent, this 
may reflect the influence of one institutional school (Hayek, 1976 or Barro, 2000) arguing 
that HR is relatively irrelevant to the developmental process, being instead a good which 
wealthier  countries  choose  to  supply  to  their  population.  Against  this  is  Sen’s  (1999) 
argument in favour of all types of human rights: that freedom, fairness and reciprocity are 
important and that social capital (which is assumed to encompass elements of both economic 
and non-economic rights) has a positive effect on welfare and growth, which is, however, not 
necessarily measured in terms of monetary income only. Some tentative evidence in favour of 
Sen has come from Blume and Voigt (2007), who found positive relationships between both 
property rights and non-economic human rights and development. 
 In this paper, we enter into the debate in a fairly limited way. First of all, we wish to develop 
the notion that countries should be compared, in terms of HR, not just in absolute levels, but 
in terms of relative human rights (relative, that is, to what one might expect given their level 
of development and various other socioeconomic criteria). In this regard, just as economists 
have long recognised that certain poor countries (such as Sri Lanka) have managed to provide 
relatively  good  healthcare  and  educational  levels,  so  there  are  beacon  developing  which 
perform relatively well on HR ‘against the odds’.  
 
Secondly, we wish to analyse regional patterns in HR, and the extent to which these vary for 
reasons other than simply income level differences. ‘Bad’ regions of the World in terms of 
HR, which include not just poor regions, but regions where neighbouring countries have poor 
HR regimes, such as the Middle East and North Africa. This, of course, means that, again, we 
should widen our definition of relative human rights to encompass location-related effects: a 
country may deserve credit for providing good HR relative to its income level or relative to its 
neighbours.  Following  spatial  econometric  analysis,  we  produce  the  first  league  table  of 
human rights adjusted for location. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: The rest of this section contains a brief discussion of 
the historical spread of human rights, in particular outlining the role of international human 
rights standards and treaties.  Section 2 carries out data analysis on the Landman/Larizza 
(2009) database of human rights, before taking account of spatial factors, in order to ascertain 
some key underlying relationships to economic and social variables. Section 3 motivates our 
spatial  empirical  work  by  showing  that  there  are  significant  spatial  relationships,  and 
establishes  the  broad  trends  between  and  within  regions  of  the  globe  that  we  wish  to 
investigate.  Section  4  outlines  the  methodology  for  spatial  econometric  analysis  and  then 
estimation  results.  Section  5  produces  a  series  of  comparative  HR  league  tables,  taking 
account  of  both  location  and  other  factors.  Section  6  concludes,  briefly  discussing  the 
implications of the spatial spillovers identified in this paper. 
 
1.1 The Historical Spread of HR innovations and institutions 
 
While rights as a concept in political theory and law has deep historical roots, most 
scholars and practitioners see human rights as a modern construction  that developed out the 
tradition of citizenship rights and was universalised through a set of practices and agreements that have yielded the international system that we now have today for the promotion and 
protection  of  human  rights.  The  history  of  citizenship  is  one  of  a  struggle  for  rights,  as 
subjugated populations increasingly articulated their grievances in the language of rights and 
as modern states formed, rights became extended through law and enforcement mechanisms 
that provided greater legal protections to an increasingly wider range of rights concerns (see, 
e.g. Foweraker and Landman, 1997). The current system for the promotion and protection of 
human rights is thus an international version of rights that had been grounded in the nation 
state, which are now seen as an inherent feature of all human beings by virtue of them being 
human.  They  thus  transcend  the  nation  state  in  terms  of  individual  entitlement  to  an 
enjoyment of these rights wherever a person may find him or herself.  The idea of human 
rights  and  its  purported  universality  are  still  open  to  debate  with  respect  to  contested 
philosophical foundations for their existence (see, e.g. Landman 2005a), and the different 
ways in which they are understood across the many different political contexts found in the 
World today.  
 
Beyond  the  global  development  of  human  rights  through  UN  mechanisms,  there 
have been a number of regional human rights innovations that help explain some for 
the descriptive patterns we observe in our data. Alongside the rebuilding of Europe 
after the war and strong external support for democratization, the 1950 European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  came  into  effect  in  1953  and  carries  with  it  a 
relatively strong set of enforcement institutions. The 1969 American Convention on 
Human Rights has evolved in similar fashion, although its institutional development 
had  not  really  solidified  until  the  late  1980s.  The  African  system  is  still  in 
development compared to the European and Inter-American systems, while neither 
Asia nor the Middle East have such systems for the promotion and protection of 
human rights.  There is thus a global and regional ‘architecture’  of human rights 
mechanisms with varying degrees of power and effectiveness that nonetheless have 
codified the discourse of rights and in the terms of this paper provide a number of 
‘signals’ for governments and citizens for the ways in which society’s ought to be 
governed. 
 
2  Descriptive statistics of countries in isolation. 
2.1  Comparative human rights data Much  of  our  data  comes  from  the  Landman/Larizza  (2009)  database.  The 
analysis uses a global data set on 162 countries between 1980 and 2004 (total N*T = 4050). 
The process of case selection turned mainly to questions of data availability over time and 
was in no way a function of values on the dependent variable. Microstates with less than half 
a  million  inhabitants  were  eliminated  but  the  remaining  cases  provide  meaningful 
geographical  spread  across  different  regions  of  the  world.  The  data  set  is  comprised  of 
variables  for  personal  integrity  rights  protection,  income  and  land  inequality,  and  various 
other variables.  
 
The protection of civil and personal integrity rights is operationalised using five “standards-
based”  (Jabine and Claude 1992) human rights scales: (1) the Amnesty International version 
of the Political Terror Scale, (2) the US State Department version of the Political Terror Scale, 
(3)  the  Cingranelli  and  Richards  Index  of  Personal  Integrity  Rights 
(www.humanrightsdata.com), (4) the Freedom House civil liberties scale, and (5) Hathaway’s 
(2002) scale of torture, which relies on source material from the US State Department. There 
are clusters of large and significant correlation coefficients between the human rights scales, 
suggesting  that  they  may  be  measuring  aspects  of  the  same  underlying  dimension.  The 
correlations  for  the  torture  scale  are  the  lowest  across  the  board,  which  reflects  its  more 
narrow focus on one form of human rights abuse (Hathaway 2002), but the values range from 
.498  to  .822  and  are  all  at  99.9%  levels  of  statistical  significance.  Given  this  degree  of 
agreement among the different scales, we used principal components factor analysis to reduce 
the group of interrelated human rights variables. The analysis revealed five components, but 
only one has an  eigenvalue  greater than 1 (i.e. 3.295) and  accounts for over 65% of the 
variance.
1  The  resulting  factor  loadings  for  this  component  suggest  a  strong  relationship 
between each variable and the common underlying dimension they all measure. Moreover, the 
component represents a set of human rights violations that are consistent with Cingranelli and 
Richards’  (1999,  410)  findings  about  the  uni-dimensionality  of  their  aggregate  “personal 
integrity rights scale.” 
 
Once extracted, the human rights factor score has been inverted to make more intelligible its 
                                                            
1 Given a different time coverage across the scales, we adopted the “substitute missing values with the mean” 
option to deal with missing cases, and ensure the widest coverage of the factor-score. This procedure is justified 
by the fact that missing cases are randomly distributed both across indicators and across countries (note also that 
for each country year between 1980 and 2004, at least 2 indicators were available).  
 substantive meaning, where low values of the factor score correspond to a low protection of 
human rights (high violations) and high values correspond to a high protection of human 
rights (low violations)
2.  This variable is approximately normally distributed, with a mean by 
definition of 0, a minimum value is –2.7 and a maximum value is 1.97. The use of this 
component  has  several  distinct  advantages.  It  simplifies  the  presentation  of  the  empirical 
findings, reduces the need for tests of robustness that substitute various specifications of the 
dependent variable
3, and avoids using ordered probit estimation techniques that are less easy 
to interpret than more standard regression estimators. 
 
 
2.2  Relationship to socioeconomic variables 
We wish to start by carrying out some fairly simple statistical analysis, to determine 
the relationships between HR and a series of socio-economic-political factors.  We 
then move on to consider how spatial data might augment this analysis.  We refer 
to a number of figures in the Appendix, showing some key relationships. 
 
Relationship  to  income  per  capita.  T h e   empirical  political  science 
literature on human rights finds a strong positive correlation between HR and per 
capita  GDP.  This  can  be  shown  quite  clearly  by  the  scatterplot  using  the 
Landman  and  Larizza  (2009)  data  (see Appendix  1,  Figure  1),  for  149 
countries  in  2004.  A  univariate  regression  (see  Appendix 1 Table 1 )  suggests  a 
gradient  of 0.292, and has an adjusted R
2 of 0.332.  It is worth noting that, while 
this  relationship  is  strong,  it  does  not  necessarily  prove  causality  in  any  one 
direction. There are credible reasons for believing that richer countries supply their 
citizens with better rights, but at the same time, there is some weaker evidence 
(Blume and Voight, 2007) that HR benefits economic growth. 
                                                            
2 As alternative data-reduction strategy, we have standardized each of the 5 HR scales, and 
computed the unweighted average. The empirical analysis undertaken here is based on the 
HR factor score. However, the use of the “average” measure did not substantially alter the 
statistical findings.   
2 We estimated the models that appear in this article using both the extracted factor score and 
the separate measures for civil and personal integrity rights, but only report those for the 
factor score since the results did not differ significantly (see the analysis section). 
3 We estimated the models that appear in this article using both the extracted factor score and 
the separate measures for civil and personal integrity rights, but only report those for the 
factor score since the results did not differ significantly (see the analysis section).  
Interestingly,  a  scatterplot  of  HR  in  2004  against  per  capita  GDP  in  1980 
(Appendix 1, Figure 2 ) indicates an almost equally strong relationship (gradient = 
0.296,  adjusted  R
2  = 0.294).  This  tends  to  indicate  that the main direction of 
causality  is  probably  from  GDP  to  HR  (or  that,  alternatively,  both  may  be 
responding to other, longstanding institutional factors). 
 
Plotting the change in HR against the change in GDP between 1980 and 2004 
(Appendix 1, Figure 3 )  is also interesting for the lack of any clear relationship (as 
well  as  the  presence  of  a  couple  of  worrying  outliers).  This  indicates  that  the 
relationship between GDP and HR is a long-term one, not short-term, and may 
also explain  the  instability  of  estimated  GDP  coefficients  in  fixed  effects,  panel 




Income inequality is negatively associated with HR (see Appendix 1, Figure 
4 )  with  an  adjusted  R
2 of  0.20.  In  this  case,  the  relationship  between  income 
inequality  in  1980  and  HR  in  2004  is  much  weaker (though  retaining  the  same 
sign).  Land  inequality  shows  a  similar,  though  slightly  weaker,  relationship  to 
HR.  In  both  cases,  there  are  plausible  explanations  for  causality  in  either 
direction. 
 
Domestic  conflict  is  strongly  negatively  associated  with  our  HR  measure,  as 
shown  clearly  by  the Appendix 1, Figure 5.  A univariate regression provides an 
adjusted R
2 of 0.462, indicating that this is a very strong association: however, the 
direction  of  causality  is  again  probably  in  both  directions  (conflict  leads  to 
worsened HR, but bad HR may trigger a conflict). 
 
Serial correlation of human rights, plotting HR in 2004 against HR in 1980, 
shows  a  clear  relationship. Interestingly,  however,  a  univariate  regression  has  a 
gradient of  0.65  (which is significantly less than 1) and an  adjusted  R
2  of  0.22. 
                                                            
4 See  Section 5  below.  Introducing  country  fixed  effects  in  a 
panel  regression  means  that  we  are  ignoring  longstanding differences 
in  the level of HR  or of GDP  across countries. 
 These suggest that levels of human rights can change significantly over time, and 
that  there  is  a  tendency  for  HR  within  a  country  to  revert  towards  its  mean 
relationship with other variables.  
 
Landman and Larizza (2009) found a number of other factors, such as ethnic 
fractionalisation,  to  have  an  important  relationship  with  HR,  but  the  simple 
analysis here, focusing on 2004 values, did not find any strong relationship. Some 
of these univariate, cross-sectional regressions are summarised in the Appendix 1, 
Table 1, below, along with a preferred multivariate regression, Reg 6.  This latter 
explains 57% of the observed variation in HR across countries, which is generally 
considered  good  for  a  cross-sectional  regression.  The  coefficient  on  the  lagged 
dependent variable is highly significant, but relatively small at 0.2684, indicating 
that  HR  can change  substantially  over  time. Political science models of human 
rights  performance  typically  include  one  year  lags  to  take  account  of  the  time 
dependent nature in the data and are thus found here to be consistent (see Poe and 
Tate 1994). 
 
3  Spatial patterns of HR 
We now wish to consider how human rights vary spatially.  As a simple procedure 
to  start,  we  simply  regress  HR  levels  in  1980  and  2004  on  a  series  of  regional 
dummies.  Note  that,  due  to  collinearity,  we  omit  a  dummy  for  Western 
Europe/North  America  (WENA),  so  that  effectively  the  regressions  compare  all 
other regions with these advanced Western countries.  Consequently, the constant 
(which improves slightly between 1980 and 2004) represents the average level for 
WENA countries, while other values represent the difference from WENA. 
 
    
Table 1: Regional Differences in HR Performance in 1980 and 2004. 
 
The first thing to note is that regional factors alone have a powerful explanatory 
role, explaining over 39% of the variation in HR across countries in 1980, and 36% 
in  2004.  Regional  dummies  are  all  significant,  with  Asia  and  the  Middle  East 
coming  out  particularly  bad,  along  with  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  However,  regions 
can  also  change  significantly  in  relative  terms:  hence  the  Central  and  Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) improved  markedly  between  1980  and  2004,  while 
Latin  America  showed  a  modest  improvement.  In  both  cases,  this  is  what  we 
would  expect,  given  the  fall  of  dictatorships.  However,  the  CIS  states  actually 
worsened on average after the downfall of the Soviet Union.  Meanwhile, human 
rights worsened in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Middle East. 
 
Plotting the changes in HR associated with the fall of communism, there is a 
marked difference between the experiences of the Central and Eastern European 
Countries and those of the CIS states.  In  Appendix 1,  Figure  6,  the  first  group, 
the CEECs.  mostly  improve  with  a  step  change  either  around  1989-90  or 1991-2 
(for  the  Baltic  states).  Two  exceptions  are  Hungary,  where  HR  improved 
steadily  throughout  the 1980s, indicating that this country was leading the reform 
of the Communist bloc, in terms of HR as well as economic reform.  Also some of 
the Former Yugoslav replics, where ethnic conflict fuelled severe problems. 
 
The  CIS  countries  of  the  Former  Soviet  Union  (Figure  7  )  show  quite  a 
different  pattern.  In  this  case,  one  group  (Ukraine,  Armenia,  Kazakhstan) 
Column1 1980 2004
Constrant 0.9591*** 1.0262***








R sqd 0.394 0.3669
*** = significant at 1% level
** = significant at 5% level
* = significant at 10% level.improved  after  1991  but  then  fell  back,  while  the  other  group (Belarus, Russia 
and  some  of  the  Central  Asian  Republics)  suffered  initially  very  bad  HR,  but 
slowly  recovered.  In  no  case  does  this  group  show  the  kind  of  sustained 
convergence on Western HR levels seen in the CEECs. 
 
Appendix  1,  Figures  8-9  show  the  trends  in  regional  HR  averages  over  the  24 
year  period,  as  well  as intra-regional  variations.  Basically,  comparing  means  of 
the various regions, there appear to be two ‘clubs’ in 1980:  the one consisting of 
Western Europe, North America and Oceania, and the other containing the Rest 
of the World.  Between 1980 and 2004 the only major real change is the CEECs, 
which  move  from  the ‘bad’  convergence  club  to  the  ‘good’.  Latin  America  has 
shown  a  modest  improvement,  reflecting  the  fall  of  dictatorships,  while  the 
Middle  East/North  Africa,  Asia  and  the  CIS  countries  have  actually  worsened, 
particularly in the period to the mid 90s (with some recovery since). 
 
Looking at intra-regional standard deviations, it is clear that all regions saw a 
major rise in HR differences at the end of the 80s through to the mid 90s.  Since 
then, almost all regions have seen convergence between their member states.  Latin 
America  is  a  case  in  point:  former  dictatorships,  notably  Chile,  Uruguay  and 
some of the Central American republics, have moved sharply up the table, while the 
previous regional leader, Costa Rica, has declined a little. This is shown in Figure 
11. 
 
This simple analysis does not, of course, explain how much of these regional 
differences are attributable to bad HR regimes, as opposed to low income levels or 
the  presence  of  domestic  conflict.  Hence,  the  set  of  regressions  in  Appendix  1, 
Table 2 build on the analysis in Reg 6. 
 
Reg  7  is  effectively  a  simplification  of  Reg  6,  reexpressed  with  the  change 
(between  1980  and  2004) in  HR  as  the  dependent  variable,  and  with  inequality 
dropped  as  an  explanatory  variable.  It  is  worth noting  that  an  adjusted R
2  of 
0.5  is  good  for  a  cross-section  regression  expressed  in  differences,  and  that all 
explanatory  variables  are  highly  significant.  Reg  8  just  augments  this  equation with  our  set  of  regional dummies.  These  perform  less  well  than  in  the  levels 
regression,  but  there  are  significant  variables  for  the  Middle  East  (significant 
negative  change)  and  (marginally)  for  Asia.  The  rising  negative  coefficient  on 
initial IHRFACTOR shows that human rights exhibit less persistence once regional 
variables are taken into account. 
 
Interpretation 
While  we  can  identify  clear  regional  differences  in  HR  provision,  interpretation 
may  not  be  easy.  First of  all,  a  regional  pattern  may  reflect  common  causal 
factors,  which happen to be concentrated in certain global  regions.  For  example, 
in  the  case  of  property  rights  and  the  rule  of  law,  Acemoglu  et  al  (2004) argue 
that different patterns of colonisation have resulted in very different patterns:  in 
those  areas  which  European  colonists  found  relatively  empty,  they  instituted 
property  laws  and  institutions  which  favoured fairly  equitably  the  rights  of  all 
the  new  settlers,  whereas  where  there  was  an  existing  large  population and/or  a 
valuable resource  base  to  exploit,  institutions  were  put  in  place  which favoured 
the  colonists  at the  expense  of  the  indigenous  (or  imported  slave)  population. 
Nunn’s  (2007b)  work  on  the  role  of  slavery in  determining  bad  institutions  in 
Africa  is  in  this  same  tradition.  There  are  good  reasons  to  believe  that 
persistence of bad institutions may also apply in the case of human rights. 
 
Countries in a region can also share a common culture, which may be more or 
less favourable to human rights  (or  interpret  them  in  different  ways  to  Western 
compilers  of  HR  indices).  Alternatively,  there  may  be  common  causes  in  the 
sense of regional security crises.  There may be rebellions by cross-border ethnic 
groups,  such  as  the  Kurds.  Civil  wars  may spread across borders (for example, 
the  displacement  of  the  Rwandan  crisis  in  the  1990s  to  neighbouring  Congo). 
Moreover,  economic  activity,  such  as  GDP  per  capita, follows  spatial  patterns. 
However, we can correct for this latter observation by including GDP per capita 
in  any  spatial  regressions,  so  that,  when  we  estimate  the  effect  on  HR  in  a 
particular  country  of  HR  in  its neighbours,  then  a  spillover  from  GDP  in  one 
country to its neighbours feeding through into higher HR in both countries can be 
removed from the estimation by including local HR in our regressions.   
The alternative explanation of spatial patterns is direct spillovers between HR 
in  one  country  and  its neighbours.  For example, this may reflect colonisation or 
occupation  (as  in  the  Soviet  Bloc).  However,  even  when  one  country  does  not 
force  its  HR  standards  (good  or  bad)  on  its  neighbours,  it  may  have  strong 
influence,  for  example  through  treaties  and  issue-linkages  in  trade  negotiations 
(such as in the case of the European Union).  Alternatively, private investors may 
react to differences in observed HR in other countries: this may well have selfish 
rationale, since a country which behaves well in terms of HR may well be signalling 
responsible governance in other areas. 
 
Beyond this, there is plenty of evidence of demonstration effects, as can be seen 
in  Latin  America  in  the  1980s/90s  or  the  Middle  East/North  Africa  today.  A 
country which liberalises its political and legal system with no adverse effects (or 
maybe  with  benefit)  is  likely  to  have  a  positive  influence  upon  other  countries. 
We would expect this effect to be stronger, the closer the ties between countries’ 
citizens, and the greater the similarities between the countries.  The former reason, 
in particular, suggests a gravity-type spatial spillover mechanism, since a country 
which is large and nearby will have more effect on its neighbours, both through 
trade and through personal and other connections. 
 
In summary,  we need to  try and differentiate between common causal factors 
and spillover effects, where possible, when carrying out econometric analysis. 
 
4 Spatial Econometrics 
Methodology 
 
Having  ascertained  that  there  are  clear  regional  patterns  in  HR,  we  develop  in 
this  section  a  more  formal  spatial  econometric  model,  based  upon  a  panel  of 
countries between 1992 and 2004
5.
2  The critical assumption here  is  that  changes  in 
                                                            
5  We  have  to  exclude  countries  for  which  data  are  missing: 
consequently,  it  was  decided  to  start  in  1992  (after  the  major national 
boundary  changes  associated  with  the  breakup  of  the  former  Soviet one  country’s  HR  is  correlated  with  those  in  other  countries,  with  the  degree  of 
correlation  depending  upon  distance.  This  is  a  common  assumption  in  spatial 
econometrics (Arbia et al, 2010). 
 
We model the statistical link between HR in one country and others in the form 
of  a  n  by  n  spatial  weight  matrix  (where  n  is  the  number  of  countries  in  the 
sample).  One  potential  spatial  weight  matrix  is  expressed as  the  inverse  of  the 
square  distance between  each  pair  of  country  to account for  the  intuition  that a 
given country is more related to closer countries than to further ones: 
          0         , 
         
1 
           , 
(1) 
where dij denotes the geographical distance between countries i and j. 
 
As  an  alternative,  we  might  also  decide  to  weight  countries  according  to 
population  size,  as  well  as  distance.  It  is  likely  that  countries  with  larger 
population have a greater impact on neighbouring countries: 
          0         , 
         
1 
    
    
    
        , 
(2) 
 
where  the  geographical  distance  between  countries  i  and  j  is  adjusted  by  the 
relative size of their populations.  A third alternative might be to use a weighting 
scheme  based  upon  GDP  (as  in  gravity  modelling  of trade):  however, the main 
problem with this is that GDP may not be entirely exogenous, which could cause 
estimation biases in a spatial econometric model. 
 
Spatial  econometric  models  treat  cross-border  spillovers  as  a  form  of 
autocorrelation  (in  terms  of  distance,  rather  than  autocorrelation  over  time). 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Union),  rather  than  go  back  to  1980. 
 Hence,  we  start  by  looking  for  indicators  of  spatial  autocorrelation.  Moran’s  I 
statistic  and  the  Local  Indicator  for  Spatial  Autocorrelation  (LISA)  are  used  to 
check the global and local autocorrelation, respectively.  The Moran’s I statistic is 
given by the following expression: 
    
∑ ∑            





where Z  is the vector of a given variable in deviation from its mean and W  is the 
spatial weight matrix. 
 
Figure 1, below,  reports the results of Moran’s I statistic for HR in 1992, 
regardless  of  the  spatial  structure  imposed,  this  variable  present  a  positive 
association between the original variable and its spatially lagged version. 
Figure  
 
Figure 1: Moran’s Scatterplots of human rights based upon inverse squared distance and 
inverse squared distance times relative population. 
Figure  1  clearly  indicates  that  countries’  HR  should  not  be  viewed  as  a 
randomly  distributed  variable.  The  spatial  autocorelation  observed  in  HR  is 
0.3105  using the inverse of the squared distance and 0.3114 for the spatial weight 
adjusted  for  population.  This  spatial  autocorrelation  suggests  that  countries with good HR are more likely to be close to each other.  If this spatial dependence 
is  reflected  in  the  error  term,  regression  results  using  standard  econometric 
estimators,  which  ignore  spatial  dependence,  will  provide unreliable results
6.  In 
this paper,  we  use  a  spatial  extension  of  the  linear regression  model  called  the 
Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) that takes the following form: 
HRit  =  ρHRit  +  bXit  +  uit, 
(4)  
where ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter and captures the magnitude of the 
spatial autocorelation in HR, X is a vector with HR determinants, i  denotes each 
individual  country  and  t  represents  each  period  of  time  considered.  As 
demonstrated in Anselin 1988, the SAR model cannot be estimated by OLS due 
to the problem of bias when there is a spatially autocorrelated dependent variable. 
Consequently,  he  proposes the  maximum  likelihood  (ML)  estimator  to  produce 
reliable estimators.  We use Anselin’s ML estimator to perform the regressions in 






We  estimate  equations  on  annual  data  for  a  balanced  panel  of  91  countries 
between 1992 and 2004.  Other countries had to be excluded, as some of the data 
was  incomplete.  As  is  standard  in  panel  econometrics, models  can  be  estimated 
either  using  random  effects  or  fixed  effects.  The  difference  is  that  the  latter 
incorporate a set of country and year dummies. 
We start by running the panel estimator with fixed effects.  Results of a fairly 
simple estimation, relating HR  to  domestic  conflict,  per  capita  GDP,  inequality  of 
land  ownership  and  income  and  spatial  lags  are  shown  below,  for  the  two 
                                                            
6  We  formally  detect  the  presence  of  spatial  dependence  in  the 
standard  OLS  and  LSDV  regressions  using  the  LM  diagostic tests  to 
confirm  the  need  to  use  spatial  econometrics.  For  more  details  on  the 
LM  tests  see  Burridge  (1981)  and  Anselin  et  al  (1996).  This  is 
equivalent  to  Nickel  bias  in  models  with  serial  correlation  and  a  lagged 
dependent  variable. 
 
 weighting schemes.  We note that the population-based weighting scheme performs 
fractionally  better  in  terms  of  fit,  but  that  the  two  equations  are,  in  fact, 
remarkably consistent.  The only significant difference is in terms of the estimated 
spatial effect, which is about twice as strong once population is taken into account. 
  
Table 2: panel fixed effects regressions, 1980-2004. 
Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests indicate that the fixed effect is clearly supported, 
in preference to a random effects specification.  The Popdistfe equation also shows 
quite clearly that there is a significant positive spatial effect (coefficient near to 
0.18), which indicates that a spatial model is much preferred to a non-spatial model. 
 
However,  there  are  a  few  worrying  indications  in  this  model.  First  of  all,  while 
domestic  conflict  and  income  inequality  are  strongly  significant  and  have  the 
‘correct’  signs,  land  inequality  is  insignificant,  while  per capita GDP appears to 
have  a  negative  relationship  to  HR,  albeit  with  only  marginal  statistical 
significance. 
 
To  understand  this  latter  effect,  it  is  worth  harking  back  to  Figure  4  in 
the Appendix. Including country fixed effects means that we are subsuming into a 
set  of  country  dummies  any  differences  in  variables  which  are  time-invariant. 
Hence  we  are  really  looking  at  changes  in  HR  and  changes  in  GDP  per capita 
within  countries,  rather  than  across  countries.  But  we  already  know  that  the 
Panel with fixed effects
Dep variable IHRFACTOR Distfe1 Popdistfe1








Log likelihood -414 -411
LM test for FE 1782*** 1782***
Ethnic fractionalisation was insignificant and/or unstable.
*= significant at 10% level
**= significant at 5% level
***= significant at 1% levelrelationship between HR  and  per  capita  income  is  a  long-run  relationship,  and 
that there  is little correlation  (and significant outliers) when we look at changes 
within  countries.  The  implication  is  that  the  fixed  effects  model,  while  it  is 
statistically  more  robust,  should  be  interpreted  as  a  relatively  ‘short-run’  model, 
which  will  omit  some powerful  effects  picked  up  in  cross-sectional  regressions, 
such as the strong positive relationship in the long run between GDP and HR. For 
this reason, it is at least worth looking at panel regressions without fixed effects. 
These  are  summarised  in  Table  3  below.  The  first  two  regressions  use  the 
distance-only  weighting  scheme,  while  the  next  two  use  a  population-based 
weighting.  Once again, most of the estimated coefficients are little affected by the 
choice  of  spatial  weighting:  the  only  exception  being  the  spatially-weighted 
dependent  variable,  which  again  clearly  has  a  stronger  estimated  effect  once 
population  is  included.  Overall,  the effect of  per  capita GDP  is now significant 
and positive (although these results should be taken with a dose of salt, given the 
LM  test  evidence  in  favour  of  fixed  effects).  Both  measures  of  inequality  are 
significant and negative, while the spatial effect is somewhat stronger than before. 
 
Table 3: Panel regressions with no fixed effects, 1980-2004. 
 
In  a  model  without  fixed  effects,  it  is  also  possible  to  include  cultural  or  other 
variables,  which  may  be  largely  invariant  over  time.  This  is  important,  since 
inclusion  of  these  variables  may  help  us  interpret  the  degree  to  which  our 
estimated spatial weightings are picking up regionally-varying historical or cultural 
factors:  for  this  reason,  we  include  variables  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  Catholic 
culture and the proportion of Muslims.  Inclusion of these variables does reduce the 
power of the spatial weighting - though w*dep variable still has a coefficient of over 
Panel no fixed effects
Dep variable IHRFACTOR Dist1 Dist2 Popdist1 Popdist2
Domestic conflict -0.1446*** -0.1484*** -0.1481*** -0.1495***
LnpcGDP 0.1063*** 0.1246*** 0.0973*** 0.1125***
llandineq -0.0048*** -0.0060*** -0.0050*** -0.0059***




W*dep variable 0.1600*** 0.0950*** 0.2570*** 0.1840***
n 1183 1183 183 1183
Adj-R2 0.51 0.6 0.51 0.59
Log likelihood -1305 -1201 -1287 -11900.18  in  the  population-weighted  model.  We  would  tentatively  see  this  as  a  sign 
that  there  are  indeed  regional  spillovers,  in  addition  to  some  spatially-varying 
cultural factors present. 
 
It  is  also  worth  looking  at  some  cross-sectional  results  incorporating  spatial 
spillovers.  In  these  cases, the  coefficient  on  per  capita  GDP  is  stronger  than  in 
the  panel  with  fixed  effects.  Inequality  is  much  less significant, as, curiously, is 
domestic conflict.  However, the estimated effect of spatial spillovers is strong, at 
0.3 without the cultural dummies, and remains at 0.19 even with them included. 
Table 4: cross-sectional spatial regressions. 
 
5   Interpretation of the results 
We start  with a simple version  of  the regressions run  above  (the cross-sectional 
regression PopdistCS2).  This equation can be seen as ‘long term’,  and does not 
have the cultural variables.  We show a full table of country rankings  in  terms  of 
relative and absolute human rights in Appendix 2. 
 
First of all, in Table 4, below, we compare countries’ location.  In  general, 
countries in poor or troubled regions of the World will tend to have worse human 
rights than those in prosperous areas.  Given the large populations of  China  and 
India, and the fact that their measured HR scores are poor, we would expect those 
countries’  neighbours  to  have  poor  locations.  Our  estimates  are  shown  below: 
Congo  Brazzaville  (close  to  the  Republic  of  Congo)  has  the  worst  location, 
followed by South Korea and Mongolia.  The Low Countries are the best located 





We  would  also  like  to  extend  the  methodology  to  develop  league  tables  of 
countries  relative  not  just to  their  location,  but  to  income  levels,  the  effects  of 
conflict  and  inequality.  These  are  effectively  just  the  residuals  from  the 
regression  equation,  and  suggest  that  the  table  of  worst  and  best  countries  in 
terms of relative human rights is shown in Table 5, below: 
 
Table 4: Countries with the worst and best locations
Worst Location effect IHRfactor
Congo Brazzaville -0.58 0.19

























Czech Republic 0.21 0.80









United States of America 0.12 0.30
Bosnia Herzegovina 0.11 0.68
Norway 0.11 1.12
Uruguay 0.11 1.05 
It is worth noting the preponderance of countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa in the ‘worst’ table - perhaps it is hardly surprising that in 2011 this region 
is  experiencing  a  wave  of  pro-democratic  revolts.  Meanwhile,  China’s  bad 
performance in both relative and absolute terms is important, given its size and 
potential influence.  At the other end of the table , Chile is top (perhaps a reaction 
to its erstwhile bad record under  Pinochet).  Of the wealthy countries, only New 
Zealand,  Finland  and  Australia  rank  in  the  top  ten, alongside countries such as 











Libyan Arab Jamahiriya -0.62 -0.67
Egypt -0.60 -0.92
Philippines -0.56 -1.05
Saudi Arabia -0.53 -0.67
Brazil -0.45 -0.69
Syrian Arab Republic -0.45 -0.79
Pakistan -0.44 -1.04
Ethiopia -0.43 -1.29





New Zealand 1.34 1.42
Senegal 1.21 0.81
Ghana 1.16 0.43
Congo Brazzaville 1.07 0.19
Burkina Faso 1.05 0.44
Finland 1.00 1.54










Costa Rica 0.83 0.75
Nicaragua 0.83 0.43Senegal, Ghana, Congo Brazzaville, Burkina Faso and Sierra Leone, whose good 
HR performances in 2004 in spite of poverty and bad neighbours perhaps deserve 
some acclaim. 
 
6   Conclusions 
In recent years, economists have been increasingly turning their attention both to 
institutional  factors  and  to  spatial  relationships  between  socio-economic 
variables.  Central  to  this  is  the  idea  of  quantifying  institutional  and  cultural 
variables, and developing data panels covering a wide variety of countries over 
a  period  of time.  While  this  analysis is  not  without  its technical  difficulties, 
because of the heterogeneity of the countries involved and the frequently long-
run nature of the relationships described, these kind of long-run relationships are 
consistent  with  recent  research  by  Acemoglu  et al  (2004,  2005)  or  Tabellini 
(2008, 2010). 
We introduce a quantified index of human rights (HR) into this analysis, based 
upon a comprehensive index developed by Landman (2005), but drawing on a 
number of other studies. First, our study confirms earlier findings by Landman 
and Larizza (2009) that HR is clearly linked to other socioeconomic variables, 
though we find that this relationship is only robust in the longer term. This latter 
finding  is  in  keeping  with  the  economic  literature  mentioned  above.  The 
significant explanatory power of (24 year) lagged GDP per capita in explaining 
HR does suggest causation is primarily from income to HR, though we would 
not  wish  to  rule  out  causality  in  both  directions.  This  is  subject  to  further 
research. 
In addition, we find that there is a clear regional pattern to HR, which goes 
beyond what can be explained by GDP patterns alone. This is picked up either 
by including regional dummies, as well as by more the more explicit use of 
spatial  econometric  estimation  techniques.  We  find  that  inclusion  of  some 
simple  cultural  variables  only  mildly  reduces  the  significance  of  the  spatial 
terms,  indicating  that  there  is  probably  a  spillover  mechanism  involved  – 
something  which  should  not  be  surprising  given  the  observable  history  of 
democratic spread across groups of countries, such as the Former Soviet Bloc, parts of Latin America or most recently North Africa.  
These convergence trends are strong over time, so that countries revert towards 
what one would expect from their neighbours’ performance and their own GDP. 
However, there is significant persistence so that it is fruitful to look for beacon 
countries  whose  relative  HR  performance  stands  out  relative  to  GDP  and 
location.  
These  findings  may  be  of  particular  importance,  assuming  the  evidence  of 
spatial spillovers is robust because this indicates that beacon countries will play 
an important role in disseminating good HR practice to neighbours.  
Such  findings  may  have  policy  significance,  notwithstanding  the  importance  of  absolute 
levels of domestic HR performance since regional good performers may play an important 
part in the incremental progress of HR in the World’s poorer or more troubled regions. But 
also  that  in  modern  society  it  is  too  costly  to  rely  primarily  on  formal  law  to  promote 
cooperation. Instead, we coordinate via social norms.  
 
We tentatively suggest that in an internationally cooperative setting, social norms could play a 
larger role than previously thought, both at the regional and multilateral level. If so, the urge 
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Human rights trends for the CIS countriesFigure 8:  
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Over the period 1980 to 2004
Latin America time series plots for IHRFACTOR by countryAppendix 1 Table 1: Univariate and multivariate non-spatial regressions for human 
























Regressions for  IHRFACTOR 2004 Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6
IHRFACTOR
Constant -2.137*** -2.152*** 2.484*** 1.034*** 0.00 0.49
Ln per capita GDP 0.292***
Lnpcgdp1980 0.296*** 0.0924**
Ln Income inequality -0.0551*** -1.0102
Domestic conflict -0.379*** -0.2775***
IHRFACTOR1980 0.6579*** 0.2929***
n 149 131 137 135 162 103
Adj R2 0.332 0.294 0.194 0.462 0.219 0.729
*=significant at the 10% level 0.93
**=significant at the 5% level 0.93
***=significant at the 1% level 0.93
Regressions for change in IHRFACTOR 1980-2004 Reg7 Reg8 LR reg 8
DIHRFACTOR
Constant 0.0774 0.3457 0.45
Lnpcgdp1980 0.1010** 0.0857 0.11










Adj R2 0.499 0.534 
Appendix 2: Full ‘league table’ of relative and absolute human rights, 2004. 
Country listing  relhr  ihrfactor 
Chile  1.454189  1.2955669 
New Zealand  1.337755  1.4176708 
Senegal  1.206828  0.8066678 
Ghana  1.158283  0.4266347 
Congo Brazzaville  1.074506  0.1863208 
Burkina Faso  1.050785  0.4427343 
Finland  1.001462  1.5397748 
Sierra Leone  0.994125  0.3069091 
Australia  0.982886  1.1673601 
Madagascar  0.976123  0.3899548 
Mongolia  0.975329  0.4257719 
Canada  0.959339  1.4176708 
Panama  0.952682  0.6317843 
Sweden  0.947309  1.5397748 
Uruguay  0.92257  1.0452561 
Liberia  0.855033  0.0589768 
Japan  0.854206  1.0484973 
Costa Rica  0.833133  0.7515099 
Nicaragua  0.832047  0.4342531 
Malawi  0.822766  0.0642168 
Paraguay  0.748175  0.4342531 
Bolivia  0.715097  0.3069091 
Bulgaria  0.698011  0.5539787 
Portugal  0.665228  0.9179122 
Hungary  0.658407  0.7958082 
Botswana  0.652611  0.6317843 
Italy  0.627734  1.0452561 
Jordan  0.621049  0.1924236 
Iceland  0.614373  1.1230618 
Gabon  0.593542  0.2702293 
Dominican Republic  0.589858  0.1824267 
Gambia  0.576386  0.2702293 
Mozambique  0.549809  -0.057024 
Ireland  0.542775  1.1673601 
Republic of Korea (South)  0.532583  0.5539787 
South Africa  0.509857  0.2667169 
Kenya  0.483015  -0.18761 
Albania  0.478113  0.3060464 
Poland  0.46683  0.7958082 
Cyprus  0.44706  0.6306504 
Belgium  0.443598  1.1673601 
Ecuador  0.426993  -0.065506 
Romania  0.390668  0.303668 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.389016  0.3060464 
Norway  0.387284  1.1230618 
Spain  0.384996  0.6676014 
Zambia  0.384309  -0.307335 
Greece  0.377296  0.6760826 
Netherlands  0.368195  1.1230618 El Salvador  0.357153  0.1848052 
Tanzania  0.355322  -0.309714 
Uganda  0.330327  -0.339046 
Guatemala  0.318686  0.0650796 
Denmark  0.297784  1.1230618 
Austria  0.291616  0.9179122 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland  0.288831  0.9179122 
Luxembourg  0.286871  1.1230618 
Argentina  0.277665  0.4318747 
Togo  0.269821  -0.427061 
Peru  0.23928  -0.059403 
Malaysia  0.193903  -0.057887 
Honduras  0.154079  -0.18761 
Morocco  0.118579  -0.057024 
Jamaica  0.091361  -0.18761 
Sri Lanka  0.06961  -0.315816 
France  0.056614  0.7958082 
Cameroon  -0.13873  -0.796234 
Thailand  -0.167  -0.43792 
yemen, rep.  -0.17275  -0.671269 
Mexico  -0.2201  -0.189988 
Turkey  -0.28829  -0.309714 
United States of America  -0.28947  0.302534 
India  -0.31805  -0.925473 
Angola  -0.32685  -1.048923 
Tunisia  -0.33968  -0.427061 
Venezuela  -0.37801  -0.551543 
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  -0.39791  -0.698173 
Ethiopia  -0.43234  -1.293131 
Pakistan  -0.44262  -1.042821 
Syrian Arab Republic  -0.45356  -0.788616 
Brazil  -0.45461  -0.687368 
Saudi Arabia  -0.53355  -0.666512 
Philippines  -0.56021  -1.05368 
Egypt  -0.60189  -0.921579 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  -0.62323  -0.666512 
Bangladesh  -0.63384  -1.173406 
Indonesia  -0.74217  -1.173406 
Algeria  -0.85442  -0.804715 
Nigeria  -0.91321  -1.173406 
China  -1.00399  -1.412857 
Cote d'Ivoire  -1.08987  -1.540201 
Haiti  -1.22849  -1.541064 
Israel  -1.37556  -1.181887 
Colombia  -1.70618  -1.795268 
 
 